This paper deals with representation and solution of asymmetric decision problems. We describe a new representation called sequential valuation networks that is a hybrid of Covaliu and Oliver's sequential decision diagrams and Shenoy's valuation networks. The solution algorithm is based on the idea of decomposing a large asymmetric problem into smaller symmetric subproblems and then using Shenoy's fusion algorithm to solve the symmetric subproblems. We illustrate our technique by representing and solving Howard's used car buyer problem in complete detail.
2 for DTs and SDDs) is that the representation requires the generation of artificial states for chance and decision variables to symmetrize the problem. This leads to increased state space for some variables and thus some unnecessary computations in the solution phase.
DTs encode asymmetry through the use of scenarios. Therefore a DT representation is simple and flexible in representing asymmetry. They explicitly depict all scenarios of a problem, including timing of events and this property of DTs facilitates the understanding and formulation of many aspects of decision problems [Raiffa 1968] . One major disadvantage of DTs is that this representation does not allow quick detection of conditional independence among the variables. Also, preprocessing of probabilities may be required as a part of the representation phase, not the solution. Another major drawback of DTs is that they can become very large for realistic-size problems [Kirkwood 1993 ] and this combinatorial explosion of the representation makes DTs impractical for large problems.
A VN representation for a decision problem is compact in the sense that the model is linear in the number of variables. It is also flexible regarding the factorization of the joint probability distribution of the random variables in the model. VNs represent knowledge by functions called potentials. These potentials can be probability potentials as joint or conditional probabilities, or value potentials as factors of the utility function. The flexibility of using probability potentials either as conditional or as joint probabilities is a big strength of the solution algorithm. The asymmetry in a decision problem is encoded through the use of a third type of potential called indicator valuations [Shenoy 1996] . Through the use indicator valuations, the computation are done on what is called "effective frames," i.e. the scenarios after taking asymmetry into account. However, this modification still cannot avoid the creation of artificial states that leads to an increased state space for some variables in the model.
A sequential decision diagram (SDD) representation is a compact and intuitive way of representing the asymmetric problem. One can think of a SDD as a clustered DT where we branch on variables that cause the asymmetry in the problem. However, this method depends on IDs to represent the probability model and preprocessing may be required in order to make the SDD representation compatible with the ID representation so that the formulation table used in the solution can be generated. Also, the formulation table is a part of the representation of the problem, not the solution. So, one problem might be how to automate the information transfer from the compatible ID to the formulation table. The problem of exponential growth of standard histories in the formulation table is another major problem of this method. Further detail and comparison of these approaches can be found in Bielza and Shenoy [1996] . This paper presents a hybrid graph called sequential valuation network (SVN) for representing asymmetric decision problems. This new graphical method combines the best features of SDDs and VNs. We use the graphical ease of SDD representation and attach value and probability potentials to variables as in VNs. To solve SVNs, we identify different symmetric subproblems as paths from the source node to the terminal node. Each subproblem is similar to what Covaliu and Oliver [1995] calls a possible variable-realization sequence. Finally, we apply Shenoy's [1992] fusion algorithm for each subproblem and solve the global asymmetric problem without having to create any artificial states, thereby avoiding unnecessary computations.
An outline of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we give a complete statement of a modified version of Howard's [1962] used car buyer problem, and describe DT, VN, and SDD representations of it. In Section 3, we represent and solve the same problem using SVN representation. Finally, in Section 4, we conclude by summarizing strengths and weaknesses of our representation as compared to the representations proposed so far.
THE USED CAR BUYER PROBLEM
In this section, we give a complete statement of the used car buyer's problem [Howard 1962 ]. This problem has a highly asymmetric structure. The decision tree representation and the solution of the problem is given in Howard [1962] . The representation and solution of the same problem based on influence diagrams can be found in Smith, Holtzman and Matheson [1993] , Howard and Matheson [1981] , Olmsted [1983] , Shachter [1986] , Ezawa [1986] , and Tatman [1986] . The VN representation and solution for the same problem can be found in Shenoy [1996] .
The UCB problem is as follows. Joe is considering buying a used car from a dealer for $1,000. Similar cars with no defects are priced at $1,100 at the market. However, Joe is uncertain whether this particular car he is considering is a 'peach' or a 'lemon'. Of the ten major subsystems in the car, a peach has a serious defect in only one subsystem, whereas a lemon has a serious defect in six subsystems. The probability that the used car he is considering is a lemon is 0.2. The cost of repairing one defect is $40 and the cost of repairing six defects is $200.
Joe has the option to buy the car from the dealer with an "anti-lemon guarantee" for an additional $60. The antilemon guarantee will normally pay for 50% of the repair cost, but if the car is a lemon, then the guarantee will pay 100% of the repair cost.
Before the purchase, Joe has the option of having the car examined by a mechanic. The mechanic offers three testing alternatives, t 1 , t 2 , and t 3 as follows: t 1 : Test the steering subsystem alone at a cost of $9; t 2 : Test the fuel and electrical subsystems for a total a cost of $13; t 3 : Do a two-test sequence in which Joe can authorize a second test after observing the result of the first test. In this alternative, the mechanic will first test the transmission subsystem at a cost of $10 and report the results to Joe. If Joe approves, the mechanic will then proceed to test the differential subsystem at an additional cost of $4.
If a defect exists in any subsystem, all tests are guaranteed to find it. Joe's utility is linear in dollars. Figure 1 gives the preprocessing of probabilities, and Figure 2 gives the decision tree representation and solution of this problem. The optimal strategy is as follows. Do test t 2 . If both systems are non-defective then buy with no guarantee, else buy with guarantee. The maximum expected utility is $32.87. The decision tree representation given in Figure 2 successfully captures the asymmetric structure of the UCB problem. However, the exponential growth of nodes in the decision tree representation is a big disadvantage for this model. Also, the detection of conditional independence among the variables as well as identification of symmetry among subtrees within the DT-referred to as coalescence-may be problematic during the automation of the solution procedure. Finally, preprocessing of probabilities during the representation, not the solution, stage is another major drawback of this method. 
Decision Tree Representation and Solution

Valuation Network Representation
A valuation network representation is basically a collection of decision nodes, chance nodes, utility valuations, and probability valuations. Figure 3 shows a valuation network for the UCB problem. Decision nodes correspond to decision variables and are depicted by rectangles. The UCB problem contains three decision nodes labeled by T 1 , T 2 , and B. T 1 represents the first test decision and can take four states: 'nt' (do not do the test), 't 1 ' (test the steering subsystem alone), 't 2 ' (test the fuel and electrical subsystems), and 't 3 ' (do the two-test sequence). T 2 represents the second test decision and can take three states: 's' (stop), 'c' (continue), and 'nc' (no choice if T 1 = 'nt'). B represents the purchase decision and can take three values: '~b' (do not buy the car), 'b' (buy without guarantee), and 'g' (buy with guarantee).
Chance nodes correspond to chance variables and are depicted by circles. The UCB problem contains three chance nodes labeled R 1 , R 2 , and S. R 1 represents the first test results and can take three values: 'n 1 ' (no result if T 1 = 'nt'), 'd 1 ' (one defective subsystem), and '~d 1 ' (no defective subsystem). R 2 represents the second test results and can take three values: 'n 2 ' (no result if T 1 = 'nt' or 't 1 '), 'd 2 ' (one defective subsystem), and '~d 2 ' (no defective subsystem). S represents the state of the car and can take two values: 'p' (peach) or 'l' (lemon). Note that several artificial states are created in order to account for asymmetry. For example, for the case when T 1 = 'nt', an artificial state R 1 = 'n 1 ' (no result) is created. Similarly, for the case when T 1 = 'nt', an artificial state T 2 = 'nc' (no choice) is created. Figure 3 . Valuation network representation for the UCB problem.
Utility valuations represent additive factors of the joint utility function and are depicted by diamond-shaped nodes. The set of variables directly connected to a utility valuation constitutes the domain of the utility valuation. In the UCB, there are three utility valuations labeled υ 1 , υ 2 , and υ 3 . υ 1 's domain is {T 1 } and it represents the cost of the first test. υ 2 's domain is {T 2 } and it represents the cost of the second test. υ 3 's domain is {B, S} and it represents the value of the car less of the cost of buying the car and repairing the defects.
Finally, probability valuations represent multiplicative factors of the joint probability distribution of the chance variables in the problem, and are depicted by triangular nodes in the valuation network. The set of all variables directly connected to a probability valuation constitutes the domain of the probability valuation. In the UCB problem, there are three probability valuations labeled σ, ρ 1 , and ρ 2 . σ's domain is {S} and it represents the prior probability distribution of the states of the car. ρ 1 's domain is {R 1 , S} and it is a table representing the conditional probability of first test results given the state of the car. Finally, ρ 2 's domain is {R 1 , R 2 , S} and it is a table representing the conditional probability distribution of second test results given the first test result and state of the car.
Compared to the DT in Figure 2 , the VN representation is very compact and grows linearly in the number of variables in the model. However, it captures asymmetry by creating dummy states for some variables in the model e.g. we create a new state 'no result (nr)' for R 1 if the first test decision is 'do not test', T 1 = 'nt'). This approach leads to increased state space for some variables in the model and some unnecessary computation corresponding to impossible states.
Sequential Decision Diagram Representation.
A sequential decision diagram [SDD] is a directed acyclic graph with the same set of nodes as in the influence diagram representation. However, its paths show all possible scenarios in a compact way. One can think of the SDD representation as a clustered decision tree. In fact, this property of SDDs gives us a big advantage in the representation of asymmetric problems. A SDD is said to be proper if it satisfies three following conditions. It should contain only one source node (a node with no arrows pointing to it), it should contain only one sink node, i.e. the terminal node (a node with no arrows emanating from it), and there should be a directed path that contains all decision nodes. Figure 4 shows the SDD representation for the UCB problem.
SDD representation models a decision problem using two directed graphs-an ID to represent the probability model and a sequential decision diagram to capture the asymmetric structure of the problem. The conditionals for each node in the ID are organized in a formulation 
SEQUENTIAL VALUATION NETWORKS
In this section we define a hybrid representation, which we call a sequential valuation network. The new representation combines the best features of SDDs and valuation networks. We make use of the graphical features of the SDD in order to represent the asymmetry in the problem and we make use of the compactness of the valuation networks by attaching potentials to nodes in the SDD. The SVN representation is more compact in the sense that it does not depend on any other representation whereas SDD requires a compatible ID and, Smith, Holtzman, and Matheson's [1993] IDs requires distribution trees to represent the asymmetry. A SVN representation of the UCB problem is given in Figure 5 . The main idea of the SVN solution method is decomposition of the problem into smaller subproblems. The UCB problem can be decomposed into five subproblems as shown in Figure 6 . For example, subproblem A refers to the 'no-test' decision (T 1 ='nt') and having made this decision, test results (R 1 and R 2 ) and second testing decision (T 2 ) become irrelevant to the problem. This is why the domain of this subproblem only includes variables T 1 , B and S. It can be seen that this subproblem is quite easy to solve. The same idea applies for the other subproblems and since only a subset of the set of variables in the problem is relevant to a particular subproblem, the subproblem is easier to solve compared to the global problem. Each of these five subproblems is symmetric and each requires smaller sized computations compared to the global problem. Each of these subproblems is represented as a unique path from the initial node T 1 to the terminal node T in the SVN representation. We solve the global problem by identifying these unique paths in the SVN and then by applying Shenoy's fusion algorithm that is used for symmetric problems. In this way, we do not need to create any dummy states for variables in the model and hence can deal with smaller domains. Also, we can still represent asymmetric structure of the problem in a compact way. Figure 6 . The symmetric subproblems in the UCB problem.
The Global Problem The solution for SVNs is based on the fusion algorithm of symmetric VNs given in Shenoy [1992] . Let X D be the set of decision variables and X R be the set of chance variables in the problem. Then the set of all variables in the model is X = X D X R . Let P denote the set of value and probability potentials. We define each variable x∈X as a record that contains three pieces of information as the following. record x (character) type; /* 'C' for chance variables, 'D' for decision variables */ (array) frame; /* the set of possible values the variables can take, i.e. state space */ (array) pot; /* a subset of P that contains the potentials with variable x in their domains */ Using this definition, x.type = 'C' denotes that x is a chance variable and x.frame is a vector that contains the possible values variable x can take. Such a structure gives us the flexibility to play with allowable values that each variable can take after taking asymmetry into account. If variable x has state space {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 } and the assymetric structure of the problem does not allow the posible outcome (X = x 2 ) in a particular subproblem, then we can simply insert a rule x.frame:= x.frame / {x 2 } and account for asymmetry without creating artificial states for other subproblems.
We also define a special type of record T where the final utility potential calculated by the procedure and the optimal strategy leading to it are kept. A formal description of T is as follows.
record T (array) value; /* an array of maximum expected utilities */ (array) function; /* an array which keeps the optimal decision function*/ Using this definition of the terminal node T, we are able to keep track of the output of each subprocedure. The node T is included in all the subprocedures.
The solution algorithm of SVNs can be thought of a global procedure that runs a collection of small fusion subprocedures in it. Each of these subprocedures can be thought of a procedure that takes a list of chance and decision variables, a list of probability and value potentials, information constraints, and finally the node T as inputs. This procedure first selects an allowable deletion sequence of all the input variables. This sequence is governed by the information constraints encoded in the sequential valuation network. Using this deletion sequence, the procedure deletes each variable in the input list one by one and finally stops when all the variables in the input list are deleted. The fusion algorithm is explained in complete detail in Shenoy [1992] . We use a modified version of Shenoy's fusion procedure to solve asymmetric problems within the framework of SVN. The main structure of the fusion procedure is Fusion(BC; IV; IP; T) and the input list to the procedure contains five main elements:
is basically a vector of sequential decisions that lead to this procedure. This vector denotes what decisions have already been made. So, each element in this vector is like a record of decisions that are already made at the time of execution for the procedure. IV is the input variable list that contains the decision variables and the chance variables relevant to the problem the procedure solves. It is the collection of variables associated with the path in the SVN. IV⊆ X={X D X R }. IP is the input potential list that contains the probability and value potentials relevant to the problem the procedure solves. It is the collection of potentials associated with the path in the SVN. IP ⊆ P. T is a special type of record where the final value or potential calculated by the procedure and the optimal strategy leading to it are kept.
An implicit input to each subprocedure is the set of precedence relations implied by the information constraints in the problem. Let {D 1 , …, D n } be the order of decisions to be denoted by each decision's index. Partition X R into disjoint sets I 0 , …, I n such that for k∈(0, n), I k is the set of variables that will be observed between decisions D k and D k+1 . Then it is easy to see I 0 is the initial evidence variables and I n is the set of variables that will never be observed.
This means that there exists a partial ordering % on X = X D X R . In the UCB problem, we have a unique ordering as T 1 % R 1 % T 2 % R 2 % B % C so that I 0 ={}, I 1 ={R 1 }, I 2 ={R 2 }, I 3 ={S}.
Based on the definitions given so far, the prototype fusion procedure is given below.
Procedure with respect to partial ordering %. If IV contains no random variable x such that x ∈ I k-1 then fusion gives a single value as output, else if there is a subset h of random variables h ⊆ I k-1 in IV, then fusion gives a value potential conditioned on h.
3.3
The Solution of the UCB Problem.
The original asymmetric problem starts with a general fusion procedure that takes all the variables and all the potentials in the problem as inputs. However, the asymmetric structure of the problem requires the use of only certain subsets of the potentials in P as functions of decision sequences. The subproblems can be solved as nested fusion procedures under one big fusion procedure as shown below. 
Since we make use of the SVN representation, we do not need to create any artificial states like 'n 1 ' for R 1 when T 1 = 'nt'. Another point is that some paths to the end points might take the same subset of potentials and variables as inputs and this means the calculations for one subprocedure can make use of the calculations that are already done for another subprocedure with the same input list.
The probability and value potentials are given in Tables I and II.   Table I . Value Potentials in the UCB Problem. This subprocedure admits variables T 1 , B, S and potentials σ, υ 1 , υ 3 as inputs and deletes the variables in its input list in the order (S, B). As seen in Table III, This subprocedure admits variables T 1 , R 1 , B and S and potentials ρ 1 , σ, υ 1 and υ 3 as inputs and deletes the variables in its input list in the order (S, B, R 1 ). Since S is deleted first, we calculate the conditional probabilities for S given R 1 first, the calculations are given in Table IV . Table V shows the deletion of each variable one by one. This subprocedure admits variables T 1 , T 2 , R 1 , B and S and potentials ρ 1 , σ, υ 1 , υ 2 and υ 3 as inputs and deletes the variables in its input list in the order S, B, R 1 . All these operations are already done for subprocedure B, so we do not need to redo them. For this purpose, it is required to make a simple check on whether the input lists of two different subprocedures are the same. This subprocedure admits variables T 1 , R 1 , R 2 , B and S and potentials ρ 1 , ρ 2 , σ, υ 1 and υ 3 as inputs and deletes the variables in its input list in the order S, B, R 1 , R 2 . Since S is deleted before R 1 and R 2 , first the conditional probability of S given R 1 and R 2 is calculated. Table VII shows the calculations. Since σ⊗ρ 1 is calculated before, we do not multiply these two potentials again. Table VIII shows the deletion of B from the procedure. The final column in this table contains only R 1 and R 2 in its domain. Table IX shows the deletion of R 1 and then R 2 respectively. Since R 2 is deleted before R 1 , a new probability potential ρ 8 is calculated. This potential is basically the conditional distribution of R 2 given R 1 . Based on the initial decision alternative T 1 = t 2 , this procedure calculates the maximum utility as 45.86 + υ 1 (t 2 ) = 32.86 and records it in V. The optimal strategy is buy without guarantee only if both subsytems turn out to be nondefective, i.e. (R 1 =~d 1 , R 2 = ~d 2 ). This subprocedure admits variables T 1 , T 2 , R 1 , R 2 , B, S and potentials ρ 1 , ρ 2 , σ, υ 1 , υ 2 , υ 3 as inputs and deletes the variables in its input list in the order S, B, R 1 , R 2 . All these operations are already done for subprocedure D, so we do not need to redo them.
Once again IV contains R 1 and the highest indexed variable in BC is T 2 . (R 1 % T 2 ) So, the output obtained from this procedure is a table consisting of the values calculated by subproblem (D) just before R 1 is deleted. Therefore, the output is basically a table of maximum utilities conditioned on R 1 as given in Table X . Based on starting decisions T 1 = t 3 and T 2 = c , this fusion procedure calculates 32 + ν 1 (t 3 ) + ν 2 (c)= 18 with optimal decision B= 'g' if R 1 = 'd 1 ' is observed and 44 + ν 1 (t 3 ) + ν 2 (c) =35.33 with optimal decision B= 'b' if R 1 = '~d 1 ' is observed.
After the execution of subprocedures, the outputs of subprocedures C and E are combined in one table. Table XI gives the combined results from C and E. Both of these fusions have T 2 as the highest indexed variable in BC and both of them contain R 1 in IV such that R 1 % T 2 . So, we first delete T 2 and then R 2 from the tables and obtain the maximum expected utility for decision choice T 1 = 't 3 '. Finally, the results obtained after the execution of the global fusion procedure with five fusion subprocedures in it are combined and the initial decision variable T 1 is marginalized out by maximization as max{28(A), 32.6(B), 32.86(D), 32.67(C,E)} = 32.86
The optimal strategy comes from subprocedure D where T 1 = t 2 and we buy with no guarantee only if both subsytems turn out to be nondefective, i.e. R 1 = ~d 1 , R 2 = ~d 2 . Otherwise, we buy with guarantee. This is the same solution obtained by the decision tree representation given earlier.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have described a new representation and an associated solution algorithm for the representation and solution of asymmetric decision problems. Several other methods have been proposed previously. However each of these models has come with a set of weaknesses either in the representation of asymmetry or in the solution method. The new representation, called sequential valuation network (SVN), combines the best features of two graphical methods: Valuation networks [Shenoy 1992 [Shenoy ,1993 , and sequential decision diagrams [Covaliu and Oliver 1995] . We use the graphical expressiveness of SDD representation of asymmetric problems. In this way, we do not have to create dummy states for some variables in the model and thus avoid the increased state space and unnecessary cells with zero value that denote impossible configurations. We then attach value and probability potentials to variables as in VNs. This allows us to see both the asymmetric and functional structure in a compact way. Most importantly, the new representation does not require another representation (unlike SDDs which require a compatible ID representation and IDs which require distribution trees to account for asymmetry). Also, the SVN representation does not need to create new potentials unlike VN which creates indicator valuations to account for asymmetry.
We solve the problem by decomposing it into symmetric subproblems. Using the new representation, we identify different symmetric subproblems as paths from the source node to the terminal node. Finally, we apply Shenoy's fusion on each subproblem and solve the global asymmetric problem without having to create any artificial states and thereby avoiding unnecessary computations. A possible weakness of the model might be whether it can represent all kinds of asymmetries or not. However, this problem of representing all kinds of asymmetries is common to all the models suggested so far. We believe that it needs to be explored further.
